Peer-Reviewed Journal Publications
"Barriers to Later Retirement for Men: Physical Challenges of Work and Increases in the Full Retirement Age."
with David Neumark. Research on Aging 2018, 40 (3): 232-256.
Abstract:
Policy changes intended to delay retirements of older workers and extend their work lives may run up against barriers owing to rising physical challenges of work as people age. We examine whether physical challenges at work influence employment transitions of older male workers in the age range for which public policy is trying to extend work lives, and whether older male workers are able to mitigate these challenges while still remaining employed. The evidence indicates that physical challenges pose a barrier to extending work lives, although some older male workers with physically-demanding jobs are able to mitigate these demands – either at new jobs or with the same employer. Our findings suggest that greater accommodation of physical challenges faced by older workers would likely increase the success of policies intended to induce later retirement.
Published version here
with David Neumark. Research on Aging 2018, 40 (3): 232-256.
Abstract:
Policy changes intended to delay retirements of older workers and extend their work lives may run up against barriers owing to rising physical challenges of work as people age. We examine whether physical challenges at work influence employment transitions of older male workers in the age range for which public policy is trying to extend work lives, and whether older male workers are able to mitigate these challenges while still remaining employed. The evidence indicates that physical challenges pose a barrier to extending work lives, although some older male workers with physically-demanding jobs are able to mitigate these demands – either at new jobs or with the same employer. Our findings suggest that greater accommodation of physical challenges faced by older workers would likely increase the success of policies intended to induce later retirement.
Published version here
| mclaughlin_neumark_roa_forthcoming.pdf |
| mclaughlin_neumark_roa_forthcoming_online_appendix.pdf |
"Does Communist Party Membership Pay? Estimating the Economic Returns to Party Membership in the Labor Market in China.” Journal of Comparative Economics 2017, 45 (4): 963-983.
Abstract:
Many studies have found that Chinese Communist Party membership brings economic benefits to Party members, but some studies also argue that the premium associated with Party membership is merely due to members' higher levels of ability and advantageous family backgrounds. The lack of consensus on the economic returns of Party membership implies that the role of Party membership is not well understood. This study estimates the economic returns to Party membership using complementary approaches to address the endogeneity of Party membership status: propensity score matching and instrumental variables. Although the magnitudes of these estimates vary across estimators, all the estimates show positive economic returns to Party membership. This paper also examines possible mechanisms for how Party membership may bring benefits to members and provides evidence that Party membership may generate political capital, but not social capital in the labor market in China.
Published version here
Abstract:
Many studies have found that Chinese Communist Party membership brings economic benefits to Party members, but some studies also argue that the premium associated with Party membership is merely due to members' higher levels of ability and advantageous family backgrounds. The lack of consensus on the economic returns of Party membership implies that the role of Party membership is not well understood. This study estimates the economic returns to Party membership using complementary approaches to address the endogeneity of Party membership status: propensity score matching and instrumental variables. Although the magnitudes of these estimates vary across estimators, all the estimates show positive economic returns to Party membership. This paper also examines possible mechanisms for how Party membership may bring benefits to members and provides evidence that Party membership may generate political capital, but not social capital in the labor market in China.
Published version here
| mclaughlin_jce_forthcoming.pdf |
“Does Protecting Older Workers from Discrimination Make It Harder to Get Hired? Evidence from Disability Discrimination Laws.” with David Neumark and Patrick Button. Research on Aging 2017, 39 (1): 29-63.
Abstract:
We explore the effects of disability discrimination laws on hiring of older workers. A concern with anti-discrimination laws is that they may reduce hiring by raising the cost of terminations and - in the specific case of disability discrimination laws - raising the cost of employment because of the need to accommodate disabled workers. Moreover, disability discrimination laws can affect non-disabled older workers because they are fairly likely to develop work-related disabilities, yet are not protected by these laws. Using state variation in disability discrimination protections, we find little or no evidence that stronger disability discrimination laws lower the hiring of non-disabled older workers. We similarly find no evidence of adverse effects of disability discrimination laws on hiring of disabled older workers.
Published version here
Working paper version here
Abstract:
We explore the effects of disability discrimination laws on hiring of older workers. A concern with anti-discrimination laws is that they may reduce hiring by raising the cost of terminations and - in the specific case of disability discrimination laws - raising the cost of employment because of the need to accommodate disabled workers. Moreover, disability discrimination laws can affect non-disabled older workers because they are fairly likely to develop work-related disabilities, yet are not protected by these laws. Using state variation in disability discrimination protections, we find little or no evidence that stronger disability discrimination laws lower the hiring of non-disabled older workers. We similarly find no evidence of adverse effects of disability discrimination laws on hiring of disabled older workers.
Published version here
Working paper version here
“Do Stronger Age Discrimination Laws Make Social Security Reforms More Effective?”
with David Neumark. Journal of Public Economics 2013, 108 (December): 1-16.
Abstract:
Supply-side Social Security reforms intended to increase employment and delay benefit claiming among older individuals may be frustrated by age discrimination. We test for policy complementarities between these reforms and demand-side efforts to deter age discrimination, specifically studying whether stronger state-level age discrimination protections enhanced the impact of the 1983 Social Security reforms that increased the full retirement age (FRA) and reduced benefits. The evidence indicates that, for older individuals for whom early retirement benefits fell and the FRA increased, stronger state age discrimination protections were associated with delayed benefit claiming and increases in employment, with benefit claiming pushed from 65 to the new FRA, and increased employment after age 62 and age 65 that is then curtailed at the new FRA.
Published version here
with David Neumark. Journal of Public Economics 2013, 108 (December): 1-16.
Abstract:
Supply-side Social Security reforms intended to increase employment and delay benefit claiming among older individuals may be frustrated by age discrimination. We test for policy complementarities between these reforms and demand-side efforts to deter age discrimination, specifically studying whether stronger state-level age discrimination protections enhanced the impact of the 1983 Social Security reforms that increased the full retirement age (FRA) and reduced benefits. The evidence indicates that, for older individuals for whom early retirement benefits fell and the FRA increased, stronger state age discrimination protections were associated with delayed benefit claiming and increases in employment, with benefit claiming pushed from 65 to the new FRA, and increased employment after age 62 and age 65 that is then curtailed at the new FRA.
Published version here
